邓高明, 张鹏, 赵强, 刘晓芹. 基于Cache时间特性的AES差分时间分析攻击[J]. 武汉大学学报 ( 信息科学版), 2008, 33(10): 1088-1091.
引用本文: 邓高明, 张鹏, 赵强, 刘晓芹. 基于Cache时间特性的AES差分时间分析攻击[J]. 武汉大学学报 ( 信息科学版), 2008, 33(10): 1088-1091.
DENG Gaoming, ZHANG Peng, ZHAO Qiang, LIU Xiaoqin. Difference Timing Attack Against AES Based on Cache Timing Character[J]. Geomatics and Information Science of Wuhan University, 2008, 33(10): 1088-1091.
Citation: DENG Gaoming, ZHANG Peng, ZHAO Qiang, LIU Xiaoqin. Difference Timing Attack Against AES Based on Cache Timing Character[J]. Geomatics and Information Science of Wuhan University, 2008, 33(10): 1088-1091.

基于Cache时间特性的AES差分时间分析攻击

Difference Timing Attack Against AES Based on Cache Timing Character

  • 摘要: 通过分析数组访问操作的索引值与Cache命中的关系,找到了数组索引值与访问时间的弱线性关系,并用数组访问实验进行了验证。在一般对称加密实现过程中数组访问索引值与眀/密文以及最密钥之间的关系的基础上,提出了一种基于Cache时间特性的差分时间分析旁路攻击方法,通过实验验证了在4×104组随机样本条件下,将AES-128最后一轮子密钥16个字节的密钥搜索空间从2128缩小到298。

     

    Abstract: By analyzing the relationship between the indexes of array accesses and Cache hit or miss,weakly linear dependence between array indexes and its access time was found and verified with array accesses experiment.Based on analyzing the relationship between the indexes of the array accesses during general crypto implementation and the plaintext/ciphertext with the key,the Cache timing based timing difference analysis side channel attack is proposed.The experiment shows that with 4×104 samples,the search space of the sub-key used in the last round of the AES-128 can be reduced from 2128 to 298.

     

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